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Abstract
We investigate whether judicial decisions are a↵ected by career concerns of judges by
analysing two questions: Do judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favour
of the government in the hope of receiving jobs after retiring from the Court? Does the
government actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? To answer
these questions we construct a dataset of all Supreme Court of India cases involving the
government from 1999 till 2014, with an indicator for whether the decision was in its favour
or not. We find that pandering incentives have a causal e↵ect on judicial decision-making.
The exposure of a judge to pandering incentives in a case is jointly determined by 1) whether
the case is politically salient (exogenously determined by a system of random allocation of
cases) and 2) whether the judge retires with enough time left in a government’s term to
be rewarded with a prestigious job (date of retirement is exogenously determined by law to
be their 65th birthday). We find that pandering occurs through through the more active
channel of writing favourable judgements rather than passively being on a bench that decides
a case in favour of the government. Furthermore, we find that deciding in favour of the
government is positively associated with both the likelihood and the speed with which judges
are appointed to prestigious post-Supreme Court jobs. These findings suggest the presence
of corruption in the form government influence over judicial decision-making that seriously
undermines judicial independence. Keywords: judicial decision-making, corruption, career
concerns, public sector incentives1
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1 Introduction
The fact that many public servants have careers after their tenure in public service has long
been thought to create conflicts of interest.2 In response to this concern, many countries
constrain former public servants by requiring a cooling-o↵ period after retirement before
they seek fresh employment. However, such constraints rarely apply to retired judges.3 In
countries with term limits for judges, it is common for retired judges to go on to have careers
in the public and private sectors. This practice raises the possibility that the prospect of post-
retirement appointments influences judicial decision making. If true, this compromises the
idea of a fair and independent judiciary,4 a critical feature of a well-functioning representative
democracy. In this paper, we investigate the practice of awarding government jobs to retired
judges, and show that the concerns surrounding it are in fact valid.
We examine this practice in the context of India. Over the last 15 years, it has become
increasingly common for retiring Supreme Court Justices in India to be appointed to pres-
tigious government positions. This has been criticised as leading to a bias in favour of the
government when judges decide cases that are politically sensitive.5 In this context, alleged
corruption takes the form of the following quid-pro-quo: judges pander to the government
by ruling in its favour and in exchange, the government rewards judges who have done so
with jobs. This raises two natural questions that we confront in this paper: first, do judges
actually respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favour of the government? Second, does
the government actually reward judges who ruled in its favour with prestigious jobs? In this
paper, we answer both these questions in the a rmative.
To do so, we constructed a novel dataset of cases decided by the Supreme Court of India
between 1999 and 2014 involving the government. We analysed the full text of the judgements
and coded whether the government won or lost the case.
The key identification challenge is that a correlation between favourable judicial decisions
and government appointments after retirement may be driven simply by characteristics of
judges such as, for example, their suitability for particular appointments or their ideology,
rather than by manipulation of judicial decisions to secure such appointments. As such,
judicial decision-making may be invariant to incentives and may merely reveal a judge’s
“type” rather than indicate the presence of corruption. To address this concern it is necessary
2There is an emerging empirical literature that suggests that individuals with government experience derive
substantial value as lobbyists from their connections to serving politicians. See for example Bertrand, Bombardini,
and Trebbi (2014) and Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012). It is therefore plausible that the prospect of such
lobbying roles a↵ects their behaviour when they serve in government. See Dal Bo´ (2006) for a review of the literature
on revolving doors and regulatory capture.
3See chapter 3 of Garupa and Ginsburg (2015) for an extensive discussion of the practice of awarding jobs to
judges across di↵erent countries.
4Judicial independence is typically defined as independence from the parties to the dispute, that is, the judge
does not expect his welfare to be a↵ected by whether he decides in favour of one party or the other. More specifically
it is also seen as independence from government influence when it comes to judicial decision making. See Ramseyer
(1998) for a discussion of the idea of judicial independence and a survey of the literature.
5We present some of the public discourse surrounding this issue in section 7.
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to isolate the causal e↵ect of pandering incentives on judicial decision making.
In our framework, the exposure of a judge to pandering incentives in a case is jointly
determined by 1) whether the case is politically salient and 2) whether the judge retires with
enough time (at least one year) left in a government’s term to be rewarded with a prestigious
job. The institutional architecture of the Supreme Court of India has two unique features
that ensure that these pandering incentives are plausibly exogenous. 1) Political salience, i.e.,
whether the case is of special importance to the government, is plausibly exogenous because
cases are randomly assigned to judges. 2) The time between the retirement of a judge and
the date of the next election is exogenous in our sample for two reasons: first, all judges
retire on their 65th birthday; second, all governments served their full terms and elections
were regularly held at 5-year intervals.
We therefore use a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach where the two dimensions of variation
are the political salience of a case and election-retirement distance of a judge. We can think of
judges who retire long before an election as the “treatment group” and those retiring shortly
before an election as the “control group”. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption
that, although there could be di↵erences between salient and non-salient cases due to factors
other than pandering incentives, these di↵erences do not vary between judges who retire long
before and shortly before an election.
Using this methodology, we find that judges who have pandering incentives are more likely
to rule in favour of the government. We interpret this result as the causal e↵ect of pandering
incentives on judicial behaviour
Furthermore, we attempt to characterise the channel through which pandering incentives
work and find that the mechanism consists of actually writing judgements rather than simply
being on a bench that decides the case in favour of the government. On the “rewards” side,
we show that authoring decisions in politically salient cases in favour of the government is
positively correlated with whether or not the judge is appointed to prestigious post-Supreme
Court jobs, and the speed with which the appointment is made.
A large literature analyses the question of judicial independence. In the context of the
US, Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab (1995) find that there is no e↵ect of the ideology
of the president who appoints a judge on judicial decisions in federal trial courts. Ramseyer
and Rasmusen (1997) present evidence suggesting that in Japan, where judges are appointed
to the national judiciary and not to specific courts, deciding against the ruling party leads
to worse assignments when judges are transferred. In Argentina, Iaryczower, Spiller, and
Tommasi (2002) find that although judges do decide against the government, the likelihood
of doing so is higher when the government is unlikely to survive. Helmke (2002) also finds
similar results that suggest there is a strategic dimension to judicial decision making. Our
paper complements this literature by using the combination of random allocation of cases
and fixed retirement dates to rule out ideology-based explanations of judicial behaviour and
isolate the causal e↵ect of incentives on judicial decisions.
Our paper also contributes to the growing empirical literature on legal realism that exam-
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ines how judicial decisions are a↵ected by factors unrelated to legal reasoning. Lim, Snyder,
and Stro¨mberg (2015) show that sentence lengths are increased significantly by newspaper
coverage of the case. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) document a negative autocorrelation
in refugee asylum court cases unrelated to their merits, suggesting that the gambler’s fallacy
is at work – judges underestimate the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance.
Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010) document the existence of systematic di↵erences in deci-
sions of male and female judges. Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso (2011) show that the
likelihood of a favourable parole decision sharply increases after a judge’s lunch break. Our
paper adds economic incentives in the form of career concerns to the list of the factors that
may a↵ect judicial decisions. In attempting to understand of how career concerns a↵ect out-
comes in the public sector, our paper complements the empirical literature on career concerns
which focuses mostly on incentives within the firm such as executive compensation.6
Finally, our paper is related to the empirical literature on identifying and measuring
corruption in real-world settings.7 One approach, exemplified by Bertrand, Djankov, et al.
(2007) in the context of obtaining a driving license in Delhi, and Olken (2007) in the context
of road-building projects in Java, is to use field experiments to directly manipulate incentives
for corruption and observe the resulting behaviour. Another, exemplified by Fisman (2001),
Fisman and Miguel (2007), and Acemoglu et al. (2016) is to use event studies that exploit
exogenous changes in the environment. Our paper is di↵erent from both of these approaches
as it is neither a field experiment nor an event study, instead, it exploits exogenous variation
in incentives induced by fixed features of the institutional environment. In this sense, our
approach is closest to Bobonis, Fuertes, and Schwabe (2016) who document how variation in
the time at which a municipal government in Puerto Rico is audited, relative to the date of
election, enables voters to identify corruption and select responsive politicians.
Rather than attempting to identify individual acts of corruption, the literature above and
our paper identify corruption statistically at an aggregate institutional level. Lessig (2013b)
defines institutional corruption as “the consequence of an influence within an economy of
influence that illegitimately weakens the e↵ectiveness of an institution especially by weakening
the public trust of the institution”.8 Institutional corruption is limited to contexts that involve
“a repeated and regular practice of exchange that produces predictable or tractable incentives
within the institution”(Lessig 2013a). We examine an influence (possibility of post-retirement
government jobs) on individuals (judges) within an institution (the Supreme Court of India).
Such an influence, if present, conflicts with the purposes of the Supreme Court: to decide
6Notable exceptions are Schneider (2005) and Li and Zhou (2005). For an insightful discussion of incentive
reforms in the public sector, see Mookherjee (1997).
7Surveys include Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2012), Olken and Pande (2012), Pande (2007), and
Sukhtankar and Vaishnav (2015).
8The notion of institutional corruption was originally developed by Thompson (1995) to explain the US Congress’
deviation from its proper purpose because of the influence of several systemic features of the legislative process.
Applications include Williams (2013) in the context of dissemination of research for the benefit of funders; Youngdahl
(2013) and Fox (2013) in the context of misalignment of incentives in the design and sale of financial products;
Rodwin (2013) in the context of the interaction between pharmaceutical firms and prescribing physicians; Mendonca
(2013) and Laver (2014) in the context of judicial independence in Latin America.
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cases accordingly to law, and without fear of or favour from the government. This is likely
to weaken public trust in the institution: the idea that Indian judges are independent, and
that the judiciary as an institution is independent. In line with the empirical literature on
corruption, we present statistical evidence of corruption, that is, we find that the existence
of corruption is the most parsimonious and compelling explanation that fits the data at
an aggregate level. Given the statistical nature of our study we are unable to identify the
presence of corruption in a particular case or by a particular judge. Therefore, our use of
the term corruption should be understood to refer to institutional corruption and not to an
individual instance of corruption by a particular judge.
Our paper is of interest for three reasons. First, our paper is the first to identify the
consequences of career-concern incentives on judicial decision making. Second, we identify
corruption in a very high-profile institution subject to intense public scrutiny, where one
would expect it to be subtle and hard to detect. Finally, the kind of corruption we uncover is
systemic in nature and shaped by incentives, rather than being a “type”-based phenomenon
that is created by bad behaviour of some “rotten apples”. Hence, our findings suggest a clear
role for institutional reform in addressing the problem.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We describe the institutional background of
the Supreme Court of India in section 2, the data in section 3 and the empirical strategy in
section 4. In section 5, we present our main results about the presence of pandering, together
with robustness checks. In section 6, we explore the channels through which pandering occurs.
In section 7, we present evidence that the government rewards pandering with post-Supreme
Court jobs. We provide concluding remarks in section 8.
2 Institutional background
The Supreme Court of India is the highest court in the country. It decides both appeals from
lower courts and fresh petitions. Compared to supreme courts in other countries, it has a very
high case load. For example, in 2009, 77,151 cases were filed and 71,179 were decided. This
makes the Supreme Court of India an outlier when compared to Supreme Courts of other
countries, when it comes to access and the number of decisions (Green and Yoon 2016).
In response to perceived inaction by the executive and the legislative, the Supreme Court
has expanded its remit to matters traditionally within the purview of those branches of
government. It routinely strikes down actions by government agencies at all levels and issues
orders on policy matters as diverse as pollution, sexual harassment, etc. As noted by Robinson
(2013), “despite the range of matters, or perhaps partly because of this diverse and heavy
workload, the Indian Supreme Court has become well known for both its interventionism and
creativity.” As a result, the Supreme Court of India operates under intense public scrutiny.
Since 2008, the Constitution of India provides for up to 31 Supreme Court Justices.9
9See Robinson (2013) for a lively and insightful exposition of the institutional background of the Supreme Court
of India.
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Between 1986 and 2008, the number was limited to 26. However, the actual number of judges
has always been less than 31, with the number in January 2017 being 23. The Chief Justice
of India (henceforth CJI) is the most senior Justice of the Court with additional powers in
the appointment of Justices and the allocation of exceptional cases, as discussed below.
2.1 Allocation of cases
In the Supreme Court of India, a bench is a group of judges who jointly hear and decide a
case. Benches are always composed of at least two judges. Ordinarily, a case is heard by a
two-judge bench, but in the uncommon occasions when the two judges disagree or the case
is of exceptional importance, the CJI constitutes a larger bench of three or more judges to
hear that particular case.
Before 1994, the allocation of cases to benches was at the discretion of the Registry of the
Supreme Court. There was widespread suspicion that this discretion led to “bench-hunting”,
i.e., colllusion between lawyers and the Registry to manipulate the allocation of cases to more
favourable benches. In response to this problem, the Supreme Court switched to a system
of random computerised allocation of cases to benches. In private correspondence with the
authors, a former Registrar General of the Supreme Court who was in service when the new
system was introduced, described the change as follows:
Computerized system of filing and processing with random system of allocation of
petitions to di↵erent benches was done with that end that is to save on manual
labour, bring more speed and e ciency. [. . . ] At the same time it also eliminated
the possibility of “forum shopping” or in other words “bench hunting” by lawyers.
The Handbook of the Supreme Court also emphasises that the allocation of cases to benches
by the current system is manipulation-proof, stating that
Since the allocation is made by computer, [. . . ] there is no scope for any Bench-
Hunting. (Section VI.A.i)
Since benches composed of three or more judges are constituted by the Chief Justice to
hear particular cases, the allocation of cases to these benches is not random and we drop
such cases from our analysis.10 Therefore, our sample is composed solely of cases decided by
two-judge benches.11
10Robinson et al. (2011) shows that, since independence, the CJI has been in dissent in 10 out of more than 1000
cases decided by five or more judges, suggesting that he constitutes benches to ensure that the majority agrees with
him.
11One potential concern is that cases decided during our sample period were actually allocated to benches before
the randomisation system was introduced in 1996. This is not a concern for our sample since, in every case, at least
one judge was appointed after 1996, so that the bench must have been constituted after the change.
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2.2 Appointment and retirement of judges
Since the mid-1990s, in response to calls for increased judicial independence, the appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court has been the exclusive prerogative of the Supreme Court
itself.12 The CJI, heading a panel composed of other Supreme Court Justices, appoints new
Justices from a pool of (state-level) High Court judges and, in exceptional cases, eminent
Supreme Court lawyers. Therefore, unlike other supreme courts such as the US one, the
executive and legislative branches of government play no active role in the appointment
process. The appointment of the CJI is mechanical by convention: at any given time, he is
the judge with the longest tenure in the Supreme Court.13
According to Article 124 of the Indian constitution, Supreme Court Justices must retire
from the Court on their 65th birthday. Hence, their retirement date is exogenously determined
by their date of birth.14
After retiring from the Supreme Court, judges are constitutionally barred from practising
law in any Indian court. Many continue to work as arbitrators in private disputes or as mem-
bers of government commissions. The largest employer of ex-Supreme Court judges is the
Union government of India (henceforth government). Appointments to government positions
are considered prestigious and desirable by judges, as these enable them to continue influenc-
ing policy. Due to their prestige, competition for these positions is fierce. These appointments
are made by the executive and are consequently politically driven. This appointment process
is not transparent and is widely believed to be subject to lobbying by judges and internal
machinations within the government.
Hence, although the government has no active role in appointing judges to the Supreme
Court, it wields substantial influence over them by controlling their post-Supreme Court job
prospects, as we demonstrate in later sections. This is in contrast to the US, where the
appointment process to the Supreme Court is heavily politicised but the government wields
little influence over judges once their appointment is finalised. The two systems di↵ers in how
the government tries to influence the Supreme Court: in the US, it does so by manipulating
the type of judges who are appointed to the Court; in India, it does so by incentivising judges
to manipulate their actions through control of post-retirement job prospects.
12This change was enacted by the Supreme Court itself in its decision on the Supreme Court Advocates-on Record
Association vs Union of India case of 1993.
13Since the Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Association vs Union of India case of 1993, there has been
no deviation from this convention. Note that although there have been female Supreme Court Justices, we use
masculine pronouns throughout when referring to judges since the court has been overwhelmingly composed of
men.
14In principle, judges could choose to retire earlier than this, but this only happened for one judge in our sample
period. We discuss our treatment of this case in section 3.
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3 Data
In this section, we describe the sources and features of the data we use in this paper. We
use three kinds of data: information about cases decided by the Supreme Court, information
about judges’ tenures in the Court and information on the jobs they received after retirement
from the Court.
3.1 Case data
Using the SCC Online database15, we collected the full text of all 2605 decisions written by
judges of the Supreme Court between 1999 and 2014 where the “Union of India” appears as
one of the parties. The phrase “Union of India” is how the Union government of India is
identified in court cases.
Our sample is composed of the subset of cases satisfying the following criteria:
• We only use cases o cially classified as judgements, not orders. This is because it is
di cult to pander through orders for two reasons. First, a judgement is a decision on
a point of law whereas an order is a procedural or summary decision. As such, orders
are of minor importance relative to judgements and are unlikely to be noticed by the
government.16 Second, the name of the judge writing a judgement is always explicitly
identified but this is almost never the case for orders. Hence, in most cases, it is not
possible for the government to pinpoint the judge who wrote a favourable order. This
also present the empirical problem of identifying orders with the judges who made them.
• As discussed in section 2.1, we only consider cases decided by a two-judge bench.
• We only consider cases where both judges retired before May 2014, i.e., at least one
year before the beginning of data collection. This is because, as we show in section 3.3,
it takes on average one year for a retired judge to secure a post-SC job.
• We only include cases where the decision was unambiguously for or against the govern-
ment, as described below (although we test for robustness of our results to varying this
criterion).
• This leaves us with a sample of 667 cases. We further restrict our sample to cases where
only one of the two judges wrote a judgement (although our results remain unchanged
to varying this criterion since there are only 6 cases with 2 judgments). Our sample is
composed of the 661 cases that satisfy these criteria.
For each case, we wrote a computer program to parse the full text of the judgement to
extract information on the date of the judgement, word count of the judgement, whether the
case was an appeal or a fresh petition, whether the government was an appellant/petitioner
or respondent, the names of judges deciding the case, the name of the judge who wrote the
15SCC Online is widely acknowledged to be the most comprehensive database of Supreme Court of India cases,
used by lawyers and legal scholars.
16Examples of orders are joining several cases into one, remanding a case to a lower court, etc.
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judgement, whether the CJI was one of the judges, and whether the Attorney General of
India or the Solicitor General of India represented the government in the case.
We coded a case as being politically salient if the Attorney or Solicitor General of India
(or both) represented the government in the case. They are the primary and secondary
lawyers of the government, respectively. Both appointments are political, with the Attorney
General being a constitutional position equivalent in rank to a cabinet minister. As such,
these lawyers only appear in cases of great importance to the government in power.17
Finally, a key case-level variable is whether the government won or lost. We hired second-
and third-year law students as research assistants (RAs). Their task was to read the full text
of each judgement and input whether the government won or lost. Data entry was carried out
through an online platform we designed.18 The interface allowed for three options, namely,
the government won, the government lost or the winner was not unambiguously identifiable.
Each case was initially randomly assigned to two RAs. If the two RAs disagreed in their
coding, the case was randomly assigned to a third RA.19 This happened in less than 10% of
the cases. The interface also allowed RAs to rate their confidence (high/low) in their own
coding of each case. This was consistently high except for those cases with disagreements.
The summary statistics for these case level variables is are reported in table 1.
17There are also several (seven as of 2016) Additional Solicitors General who represent the government in the
Supreme Court, who appear in around half of the cases involving the government. Given the large number of such
cases, we do not consider their presence as meaning that the case is of great importance to the government, unlike
the presence of the Attorney General or Solicitor General.
18Screenshots of the online platform and instructions to the RAs are available upon request.
19Since there were three options, it is possible that disagreements persist even with three RAs, but this never
occurred in our sample.
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(1) (2) (3)
Non-salient Salient Di↵erence
mean/sd mean/sd b/se
UOI won 0.593 0.750 -0.157⇤
(0.492) (0.438) (0.076)
Number of judges who retired long before 1.384 1.568 -0.184
(0.667) (0.501) (0.103)
Appeal (1) Petition (0) 0.861 0.568 0.292⇤⇤⇤
(0.347) (0.501) (0.056)
UOI appellant/petitioner (1) Respondent (0) 0.412 0.295 0.116
(0.493) (0.462) (0.077)
CJI present in case 0.013 0.091 -0.078⇤⇤⇤
(0.113) (0.291) (0.021)
Log wordcount 8.168 8.653 -0.485⇤⇤⇤
(0.775) (0.804) (0.121)
Observations 617 44 661
Table 1: Case summary statistics
3.2 Judge data
For each Justice of the Supreme Court, we collected information on their date of birth, date of
appointment to the Supreme Court, date of retirement from the Court and date of elevation
to the o ce of Chief Justice, if ever.
Using this information, we define the variable “retired long before” as a dummy that takes
value 1 if the judge retired at least one year before the next general election, 0 otherwise.
During our sample period 1999–2014, elections occurred at regular five-year intervals as all
governments served their full term. Since, as discussed in section 2.2, the retirement date of
judges in our sample is their 65th birthday, the “retired long before” variable is mechanically
determined by their date of birth and the date of the next election after retirement.20
The tenures of all judges in our sample are depicted in fig. 2 in appendix A. The black
bars represent the tenures of judges who retired long before an election, while the hatched
ones represent the tenures of judges who retired shortly before an election. The vertical lines
represent general election dates, with the blue lines representing elections won by the UPA
(2004 and 2009) and sa↵ron representing the NDA (1999 and 2014).
20The only exception was Justice Dalveer Bhandari, who retired on the day he was elected to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), six months before his 65th birthday. We code his “retirement date” as his 65th birthday,
as his appointment to the ICJ was unforeseen during almost all of his tenure on the Supreme Court. In any case,
we repeat our analysis excluding the 64 cases decided by him in our sample and our results remain unchanged.
Another exception was Justice M. Srinivasan who died on 25 February 2000 before his 65th birthday but did not
decide any cases in our sample.
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3.3 Jobs data
We collected information on government positions taken up by Supreme Court Justices after
their retirement from the Court. In particular, we collected information on the position and
the date of appointment to that position. Whenever possible, we obtained this information
from notifications published in the o cial Gazette of India. However, as the archives of the
Gazette are incomplete, we supplemented this with an extensive search of newspaper reports
and of the archives of bodies to which ex-Supreme Court Justices are commonly appointed.
Since these are prominent positions, we are confident that our search was exhaustive.
We define a post-Supreme Court (post-SC) job as one awarded by the Union government
to a retired Supreme Court Justice. Examples include Chairman or Member of the National
Human Right Commission, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Law Commission of India and
Press Council of India. We provide a full list in table 12. For a judge who is appointed to
several post-SC jobs over time, we consider the first job as his post-SC job, since appointment
to later jobs is likely to be a↵ected by his performance in previous post-SC jobs rather than
pandering while being an active judge.
From time to time, the Supreme Court constitutes committees to investigate issues that
arise in specific cases and appoints ex-SC judges to these committees. We exclude these
jobs since they are not awarded by the executive and are therefore unrelated to the type of
corruption we investigate here. The summary statistics for judge level variables are reported
in table 2.
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(1) (2) (3)
Retired shortly before Retired long before Di↵erence
mean/sd mean/sd b/se
Number of cases 37.214 24.183 13.031
(36.787) (19.543) (7.007)
Proportion of salient cases 0.102 0.192 -0.090
(0.071) (0.197) (0.054)
Any job 0.643 0.517 0.126
(0.497) (0.504) (0.149)
PCT job 0.429 0.350 0.079
(0.514) (0.481) (0.145)
Speed of appointment 0.356 0.359 -0.003
(0.425) (0.418) (0.138)
Speed of appointment (PCT) 0.292 0.264 0.028
(0.416) (0.395) (0.122)
Tenure (years) 5.493 5.143 0.351
(1.607) (1.808) (0.526)
Was CJI 0.214 0.167 0.048
(0.426) (0.376) (0.114)
Years from retirement until post-SC job 1.527 1.118 0.409
(2.553) (2.065) (0.894)
Observations 14 60 74
Table 2: Judge summary statistics
4 Empirical strategy
We focus on corruption in the form of pandering, i.e., judges manipulating decisions in politi-
cally salient cases in favour of the government in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining
a post-SC job. At the case level, pandering occurs if the judges decide in favour of the
government when, based on the merits of the case, the opposite decision should have been
made.21 Unfortunately, as any assessment of the merits of a case is inherently subjective, it
is practically infeasible to use this approach to identify pandering in our sample of more than
600 cases.
Instead, we can statistically identify the presence of pandering by comparing benches com-
posed of judges who have stronger incentives to pander to those who have weaker incentives
to pander. We use the following definition: a judge has incentives to pander in a case if both
1. the case is politically salient, and
21We use this dichotomous definition as we only observe whether the government has won or lost a case, without
any information on how favourable the judgement was for the government.
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2. the judge retires long enough before an election.
The political salience of a case is captured by whether or not the Attorney General or So-
licitor General of India appears in the case. The presence of the Attorney General or Solicitor
General indicates that the case is one that is particularly important for the government. We
expect that pandering, if it exists, will manifest itself in these cases. Since cases are randomly
allocated to judges, as described in section 2.1, we believe that the variable capturing the
salience of a case is exogenous to judge specific characteristics that may influence the outcome
of the case.
Whether a judge retired long before an election or not is captured by whether the judge
retired from the Supreme Court at least one year before an election. We choose a threshold
of one year because, as seen in the summary statistics, it takes on average a little over one
year to secure a post-SC job, conditional on securing it at all.22 Judges who retire less than
one year before the next election have much weaker incentives to pander to the government
in power at the time of their retirement, as they are unsure about whether that government
will still be in power after the election. To transform this variable into pandering incentives
at the bench level, we simply use the number of judges on the bench who retire long before
an election. This bench level variable that takes three value: 0, 1, and 2 since every case in
our sample is decided by exactly two judges.
As described in section 2.2 and section 3.2, the date of retirement of judges is mechanically
determined by their date of birth, and furthermore, elections occurred at regular five-year
intervals. Hence, whether a judge is going to retire long before an election is predictable while
he is deciding cases and, moreover, exogenous. Consequently the number of judges on the
bench who retire long before an election is also exogenous.
We identify pandering using di↵erence-in-di↵erences, where the two dimensions of vari-
ation are the salience of a case and whether the judge retired long before an election. We
can think of judges who retire long before an election as the “treatment group” and those
retiring shortly before an election as the “control group”. We compare the salient–non-salient
di↵erence in decisions between these treatment and control groups to obtain our estimate of
the e↵ect of pandering incentives.
The basic idea behind the identification strategy is illustrated by the simple two-by-two
bar chart in Figure 1: judges who retire long before an election are indeed more likely to
decide in favour of the government in salient cases than in non-salient cases, whereas this is
not the case for judges who retire shortly before an election.23
22We discuss the robustness of our results to varying this threshold in section 5.2.
23Our regression specification is a variation of this same idea as we use the number of judges on the bench who
retire long before an election.
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Figure 1: Di↵erences in probability of case being decided in favour of UOI by salience and retirement
distance
5 Pandering incentives and judicial decisions
In this section, we present our main results about the presence of pandering. We also test
them for robustness and we address potential concerns. We implement our empirical strategy
through the following regression specification:
wonijt = ↵+   Salienti +  Number of judges retiring long beforei
+   Salienti ⇥Number of judges retiring long beforei +X0⌘ + "ijt (1)
The variables on the right-hand side of eq. (1) capture pandering incentives, while the de-
pendent variable captures the behaviour induced by them. The key parameter of interest is
 , the change in the di↵erence in the probabilities of deciding in favour of the government in
salient versus non-salient cases, when we replace a judge who retired shortly before an election
with one who retired long an election. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption
that, although there could be di↵erences between salient and non-salient cases based on fac-
tors other than pandering incentives, this di↵erence does not vary based on the number of
judges retiring long before an election on the bench. Therefore, we interpret a positive and
significant estimate of   as evidence of the behavioural response to pandering incentives.
5.1 Main results
The results from regressing our main specification eq. (1) using OLS are reported in columns
(1) and (2) of table 3. As discussed in section 4, the key parameter of interest is the coe -
cient of the interaction of salient and “retired long before”, i.e., the di↵erence-in-di↵erences
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parameter. This captures the e↵ect of incentives to pander, i.e., both the case being politi-
cally salient and the judge retiring long before an election. We observe that this coe cient
is positive and stable in all specifications, indicating that judges do engage in corruption by
favouring the government when the case is politically salient and the judge retires long before
an election.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Salient case -0.384 -0.333 -0.384 -0.199 -0.236
(0.248) (0.250) (0.254) (0.257) (0.259)
Number of judges who retired -0.0496⇤ -0.0413 -0.0477
long before (0.0294) (0.0298) (0.0335)
Salient case ⇥ Number 0.351⇤⇤ 0.329⇤⇤ 0.365⇤⇤ 0.246 0.272⇤
of judges who retired long before (0.151) (0.152) (0.155) (0.160) (0.162)
Case controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 661 661 661
R2 0.017 0.023 0.047 0.193 0.211
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 3: E↵ect of pandering incentives on decisions.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
In columns (2)–(7) we control for case characteristics such as log word count of the judge-
ment, whether the case was an appeal or fresh petition, whether the government was the
appellant/petitioner or respondent, and whether the CJI appeared in the case. The sign and
significance of our coe cient of interest is una↵ected by the inclusion of these case controls.
To establish the presence of pandering, that is to show that there’s a causal e↵ect of in-
centives on judicial decisions, we need to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by
ideological alignment of judges with political parties. For example, judges who are ideologi-
cally aligned with the ruling party could be more likely to decide in favour of the government.
Although undesirable, we do not consider this pandering. Instead, we define pandering as
behaviour that arises in response to extrinsic incentives rather than intrinsic motivations such
as ideology or innate characteristics.
Ideological alignment or other unobservable time-invariant judge characteristics are un-
likely to introduce bias in our regressions because they are unlikely to be correlated with our
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regressors. First, as discussed in section 2.1, the allocation of cases to judges is random, so
that whether a judge is assigned a politically salient case or not is uncorrelated with his per-
sonal characteristics. Second, whether a judge retires long before an election or not is decided
solely by his date of birth and the date of the next election, both of which are exogenous.24
Nonetheless, to rule out the possibility of any bias caused by unobservable judge charac-
teristics, we include judge dummies in eq. (1). Moreover, to control for time-specific e↵ects
we also include dummies for the year in which the case was decided. These would absorb any
changes in the decisions induced by political and institutional changes over time, e.g., the
increase in the number of judges in 2008. We therefore use the following regression equation:
wonijt = ↵j +  t +   Salienti +   Salienti ⇥Number of judges retiring long beforei
+X0⌘ + "ijt (2)
The results of estimating eq. (2) are reported in columns (3)–(5).25 The estimate of the key
parameter of interest, namely, the coe cient of salient interacted with “retired long before”,
continues to be positive and significant in all the specifications except for the one reported
in (4) even though the point estimate in column (4) is similar to the other OLS estimates.
Moreover the logit and probit results with judge and year dummies reported in columns (6)
and (7) are strongly significant.26
We now discuss possible sources of bias in our results. We show that these sources either
lead to no bias or a downward bias in our estimates. As such, the estimates we presented are
lower bounds of the e↵ect of pandering incentives on judicial decisions.
Incentives for the “control” group It is possible that the “control” group of judges
that retire shortly before an election have some rather than no incentives to pander. In that
case, the comparison between “treatment” and “control” judges is not a comparison between
judges with and without incentives, but rather a comparison between judges with stronger
and weaker incentives to pander. Therefore, our estimates of this di↵erence are lower bounds
on the true e↵ect of pandering incentives on judicial decisions.
Greater scrutiny for politically salient cases One possibility is that politically
salient cases receive more scrutiny and therefore judges are less likely to decide in favour of
the government when such cases favour the other litigant on merits, relative to non-salient
cases. If true, this will only make the di↵erence-in-di↵erences smaller as it reduces the
di↵erence between “treatment” and “control” judges in how they decide politically salient
cases, again, making our estimates lower bounds.
24In our sample period, elections occurred regularly every five years.
25The “retired long before” variable is dropped from these specifications as it only varies by judge.
26Our sample is not a panel as there is one observation per case. Hence the incidental parameter problem does
not apply and we can estimate logit and probit with judge and year dummies.
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Non-random appearance of AG or SG A possibility is that the Attorney General
(AG) or Solicitor General (SG) may be more likely to appear in cases where the government is
more likely to win. If true, this would simply be di↵erenced out if it a↵ects both “treatment”
and “control” judges. Another possiblity is that the AG or SG are more likely to appear
before judges in the “treatment” group. This is ruled out by the fact that AG or SG are
equally likely to appear before judges in the “treament” and “control” groups, as shown in
table 2.
A further possibility is that the AG or SG are more likely to appear before judges who are
more likely to decide in favour of the government. This is unlikely, as we see in table 2 that
the proportion of cases that are politically salient is the same across judges in our “treatment”
and “control” groups. Moreover, since cases are randomly assigned to judges, such behaviour
would only occur if the AG or SG systematically believe that they are more likely to win
before “treatment” group judges. Therefore, this is simply another form in which pandering
incentives a↵ect the likelihood of a decision in favour of the government.
Settlement of cases Similar to the point above, a key concern with the literature on
published judgements is the selection bias – judgements may not be a representative sample
of all cases since a significant fraction of cases are actually settled before they are decided
by the court. In fact, there may be di↵erences in the likelihood of out-of-court settlement
between cases assigned to benches with “treatment” group judges and cases assigned to
benches with “control” group judges. As pointed out by Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab
(1995), random allocation of cases to judges means that any di↵erences in the probability
of the government winning a case must be due to di↵erences in judicial behaviour rather
than unobservable case characteristics. As such, the observed di↵erences reflect the e↵ect of
pandering incentives on judicial decisions.
Beliefs about elections It is possible that pandering incentives are a↵ected by a judge’s
beliefs about elections. For example, a judge retiring shortly before an election may pander
if he believes that the government in power will be reelected and he would be rewarded after
election. It is also possible that a judge retiring long before an election only begins to pander
after the last election in his tenure before his retirement.27 Note in any of these scenarios
where a particular configuration of beliefs leads to pandering by judges who retire shortly
before an election, or leads to weaker pandering by judges who retire long before one, there
will be downward bias in the di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator. The reason why the e↵ect of
pandering incentives will be underestimated is that for at least some part of their tenure there
27One way of testing this would be to interact pandering incentives with whether the case in question was filed
after the government in power at the time of a judge’s retirement was elected. We would expect the e↵ect of
pandering incentives to be particularly strong in the final part of a judge’s term. Unfortunately we do not observe
the date of filing of a case. The date of the decision that we do observe is not a satisfactory proxy for this as it
can take years for a case to be decided. Moreover, the date of decision is likely to be endogenous since judges with
pandering incentives could expedite or delay certain cases based on how this a↵ects their post-SC appointment
prospects.
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will be little di↵erence between our “treatment” and “control” groups, i.e., judges who retire
long and shortly before an election, in their pandering incentives.28 Therefore, the e↵ect of
pandering incentives are bounded below by the positive and significant estimates in table 3.
Another possibility is that judges retiring shortly before an election systematically decide
politically salient cases against the government in power at the time of retirement. This could
happen if these judges believe that the government at the time of retirement will lose the
next election and the opposition party at the time of retirement would reward them once they
form the next government. Although this is unlikely to be the full story since the incumbent
lost only one of two elections that occured in our sample period, this is certainly consistent
with our results. Note that such behaviour is nonetheless an e↵ect of pandering incentives
on judicial decision making, albeit one where the judges retiring shortly before an election
pander to a potential future government rather than the current one.
5.2 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of our results to perturbing di↵erent elements of baseline
specification.
Using factor variables In the specification presented in equations (1) and (2), we have
used the number of judges that retire long before an election as our interacting variable with
political salience of the case. As discussed before, since there are two judges deciding each
case, this variable takes three values: 0, 1, and 2. This forces the marginal e↵ect of pandering
incentives on decisions to be constant. We now estimate the following specification:
wonijt = ↵+   Salienti
+  0Neither judge retired long beforei
+  2 Both judges retired long beforei
+  0 Salienti ⇥Neither judge retired long beforei
+  2 Salienti ⇥ Both judges retired long beforei
+X0⌘ + "ijt (3)
Our baseline specification in eq. (1) is a special case of eq. (3) as it forces the restrictions
  0 =  2 and   0 =  2. The specification in eq. (3) allows the e↵ect of a change in pandering
incentives going from a bench with no judges who retire long before an election to a bench
with one judge who retires long before an election, to be di↵erent from the e↵ect as we go
from a bench with one judge who retires long before an election to a bench with both judges
retiring long before an election.
The results are reported in table 4. The estimates for  2 are stable and positive across
28This downward bias is even stronger in the unlikely event that judges who retire shortly before an election have
stronger pandering incentives than those retiring long before, as this would lead to a negative estimate of the e↵ect.
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all specifications. We find that regression cannot estimate  0 because there are no politically
salient cases in our sample that are assigned to a bench where neither judge retired long
before an election. This implies that the variation used for estimating   in specifications
eq. (1) and eq. (2) comes from politically salient cases decided by benches with one or two
judges retiring long before an election.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Salient case -0.0441 -0.0152 -0.0206 0.0372 0.0287
(0.116) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120)
Neither judge retired long 0.0176 0.00903 0.0428 -0.0631 -0.0467
before (0.0681) (0.0684) (0.0721) (0.109) (0.113)
Both judges retired long -0.0649 -0.0566 -0.0500
before (0.0416) (0.0419) (0.0447)
Salient case ⇥ Both 0.366⇤⇤ 0.344⇤⇤ 0.367⇤⇤ 0.259 0.280⇤
judges retired long before (0.154) (0.155) (0.157) (0.162) (0.163)
Case controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 661 661 661
R2 0.017 0.024 0.047 0.194 0.212
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 4: Factor variables for retired long before.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Logit and probit Next we rerun our baseline specification using logit and probit instead
of the linear probability model. We observe that the coe cient estimates of   remain positive
and significant.29 The results are reported in table 5.
29Note that there are fewer observations in the logit and probit regressions. This is because in two years, all
salient cases were decided in favour of the government, so that when we include year dummies, those observations are
dropped. Similarly, for six judges, all salient cases were decided either all in favour of or all against the government.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit Logit Logit Logit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Salient case -2.022⇤ -1.812 -1.492 -1.620 -1.191⇤ -1.060 -0.897 -0.968
(1.131) (1.145) (1.325) (1.343) (0.675) (0.683) (0.770) (0.782)
Number of judges who retired -0.208⇤ -0.173 -0.129⇤ -0.108
long before (0.125) (0.127) (0.0770) (0.0783)
Salient case ⇥ Number 1.882⇤⇤ 1.795⇤⇤ 1.690⇤ 1.770⇤ 1.105⇤⇤ 1.053⇤⇤ 1.012⇤ 1.052⇤
of judges who retired long before (0.781) (0.787) (0.952) (0.964) (0.442) (0.447) (0.539) (0.545)
Case controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Judge dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 644 641 661 661 644 641
R2
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 5: Logit and probit.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Retirement threshold Recall that the variable “retired long before” takes value 1 if the
judge retires at least one year before an election. We pick one year as the threshold because
on average it takes a little over one year for a judge to be appointed to a post-SC job, as
shown in table 2. To ensure that our results are robust to di↵erent thresholds for the “retired
long before” variable, we repeat the regressions with thresholds of 6 and 24 months. We
report these results in table 6. The coe cient of the interaction term remains positive and
significant, for the 6 month threshold. The coe cient declines in size and significance as the
threshold is increased to 18 and 24 months although the coe cient remains positive. The
decline in size and significance with an increase in the threshold window is not altogether
unexpected as more and more judges in the “treatment” group, that is judges with incentives
to pander, are assigned to the “control” group. As such we expect the di↵erence-in-di↵erences
to decline with an increase in the threshold.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 6 18 18 24 24
Salient case -0.549⇤ -0.384 -0.216 -0.120 -0.0549 0.0270
(0.308) (0.326) (0.227) (0.246) (0.206) (0.220)
Number of judges who retired -0.139⇤⇤⇤ -0.0331 -0.0602⇤⇤
long before (0.0346) (0.0282) (0.0266)
Salient case ⇥ Number 0.412⇤⇤ 0.324⇤ 0.268⇤ 0.213 0.172 0.118
of judges who retired long before (0.171) (0.182) (0.152) (0.167) (0.148) (0.162)
Case controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661
R2 0.034 0.212 0.012 0.210 0.015 0.208
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 6: Di↵erent thresholds for retired long before.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Continuous distance from retirement to election So far we have constructed the
number of judges retiring long before an election using a dummy variable to indicate whether
each judge on the bench retires long before or shortly before an election. We believe that this
is the correct way to proxy for incentives to pander since these ought to decline sharply around
the one-year threshold since it takes on average that long to secure a post-SC appointment.
Nonetheless, we substitute the number of judges retiring long before an election with the
sum of the log of distance from retirement to next election for the two judges on the bench.
Results are reported in table 7. We find that our results are robust to using this continuous
measure of the time from retirement to next election.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Salient case -0.183 -0.154 -0.177 -0.181 -0.193
(0.217) (0.217) (0.218) (0.226) (0.227)
Sum years from retirement to 0.0000985 0.000104 0.0000655
election (0.000177) (0.000177) (0.000183)
Salient case ⇥ Sum 0.0677⇤ 0.0661 0.0719⇤ 0.0724⇤ 0.0751⇤
years from retirement to election (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0406) (0.0428) (0.0430)
Case controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 661 661 661
R2 0.011 0.020 0.042 0.194 0.212
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 7: Continuous variable for retired long before.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Cases with no clear winner In our data collection interface, we gave three options for
coding the outcome of a case: government won, government lost, and winner not identifiable.
The last option was to allow for cases where it was not clear if the government won or lost.
This could happen when, for example, some of the points in dispute in a case were decided
in favour of the government but others were decided against the government. There were
only 20 cases where the outcome of a case was coded as not identifiable, and as described in
section 3.1, these were dropped from our analysis.
We now include these 20 cases and code them in di↵erent ways to see whether our results
are robust to their inclusion. Results are reported in table 8. In columns (1) and (2) we
include these cases among the ones that the government lost. In columns (3) and (4) we do
the opposite and include these cases among the ones that the government won. Finally in
columns (5) and (6), to allow for the possibility that the decision in these cases was partly
in favour of the government and partly against it, we construct a dependent variable that
takes value 1 for the cases where the government won, -1 for the cases where the government
lost, and 0 for these 20 cases where the winner was not identifiable. The estimates of our
coe cient of interest remain positive and significant indicating that the inability to determine
clearly whether the government won or lost in a subset of cases does not a↵ect our results.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lost Lost Won Won Ternary Ternary
Salient case -0.346 -0.233 -0.346 -0.233 -0.751 -0.498
(0.249) (0.260) (0.249) (0.260) (0.488) (0.510)
Number of judges who retired -0.0362 -0.0362 -0.0916
long before (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0568)
Salient case ⇥ Number 0.337⇤⇤ 0.292⇤ 0.337⇤⇤ 0.292⇤ 0.694⇤⇤ 0.573⇤
of judges who retired long before (0.152) (0.162) (0.152) (0.162) (0.297) (0.317)
Case controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 681 681 681 681 681 681
R2 0.016 0.208 0.016 0.208 0.017 0.207
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 8: Including cases with no clear winner.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
6 Pandering incentives and judgement authorship
Although the allocation of a case to a bench is randomised, the authorship of the judgement
is not. Once the two judges decide on the outcome of the case, they also jointly decide which
one of the two writes the judgement.30 The name of the judge writing the judgement is always
identified when a judgement is delivered. In this section we explore the choice of judgement
writing to shed more light on the mechanism through which pandering occurs.
We expect that rather than simply sitting on a bench that decides in favour of the gov-
ernment, pandering may manifest itself in actually writing judgements that are favourable
to the government. There are two reasons for this. First, being the author of a favourable
judgement is more visible, and consequently more likely to be rewarded, compared to just
sitting on the bench in a case that is decided in favour of the government. Conversely, the
judge not writing the judgement is less likely to be noticed and therefore less likely to be
rewarded for favourable judgements and punished for unfavourable ones. Second, the lit-
30In principle both of them could write separate judgements. This rarely occurs – we only observe this happening
in 6 of the 667 cases.
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erature on signalling shows that costly actions are an e↵ective form of communication in
environments where talk is cheap. Since a judge’s reputation depends on the judgements
he has written, committing to written judicial reasoning for favouring the government may
be a more credible way for a judge to signal his willingness to conform to the government’s
preferences in his role after retirement in case he receives a post-SC appointment. As such
we believe that writing favourable judgement may be more important than simply deciding
in favour of the government when it comes strengthening the prospects of receiving post-SC
appointments. This hypothesis is supported by the results in section 7 where we will see that
writing favourable judgements rather than simply deciding in favour of the government is
positively associated with securing post-SC appointments.
If this is true, we expect to see a pattern in judgement writing. In particular judges in our
“treatment group”, that is the ones that retire long before an election, should be more likely
to write judgements in cases that are politically salient and where the government wins. To
test this we run the following specification:
Author retired long beforei = ↵+   Salienti +  Woni +   Salienti ⇥Woni +X0⌘ + "ijt. (4)
We restrict our attention to the subsample of cases where one of the judges on the bench
retired long before an election and the other retired shortly before an election. Our dependent
variable is an indicator of whether the author of the judgement retires long before an election.
If judges with pandering incentives want to be noticed by the government when they decide
in its favour in salient cases, we would expect   to be positive.
The results are reported in table 9. We observe the estimates for   are positive and
significant across all specifications even after controlling for case characteristics, and judge
and year dummies. Note that the sample size drops compared to our main results as we focus
on the sub-sample of cases where one of the two judges retired long before an election and the
other retired shortly before an election. The coe cient estimates indicate that in politically
salient cases that the government wins, the judgement is more likely to be authored by a
judge who retired long before an election.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Salient case -0.172 -0.243 -0.264 -0.283 -0.231
(0.178) (0.180) (0.190) (0.177) (0.183)
UOI won -0.210⇤⇤⇤ -0.198⇤⇤⇤ -0.203⇤⇤⇤ -0.105⇤ -0.0877
(0.0630) (0.0632) (0.0635) (0.0627) (0.0644)
Salient case ⇥ UOI won 0.562⇤⇤ 0.543⇤⇤ 0.577⇤⇤ 0.566⇤⇤ 0.472⇤⇤
(0.234) (0.237) (0.246) (0.227) (0.235)
Case controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Judge dummies No No No Yes Yes
Observations 271 271 271 271 271
R2 0.055 0.078 0.139 0.484 0.511
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 9: Pandering incentives and judgement authorship.
Dependent variable is whether government won. Case controls are type of case (appeal/petition), whether
CJI was one of the judges, whether government was appellant/petitioner, log of wordcount. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
7 Rewards for pandering
Having identified the presence of corruption on the “supply” side in the form of pandering
by judges, we now focus on the “demand” side in the form of rewards by governments. In
principle, there could be many ways in which the government rewards judges who rule in its
favour. We explore whether there is any evidence that pandering is actually rewarded by the
government in a particular form, namely post-SC jobs.
Before discussing our results we note that practice of awarding post-SC jobs has been
widely criticised.31 For example, Indira Jaising, former Additional Solicitor General of In-
dia, commenting on the appointment of former Chief Justice of India (CJI) H. L. Dattu to
Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission, said that “Independence can be
undermined in di↵erent ways and one of them is o↵ering post retirement benefits immedi-
ately upon retirement.”32 Arun Jaitley, current Finance Minister, while in opposition, said
31See for example Sangai et al. (2016), a report by an independent Indian think tank that highlights, among
other challenges facing the Indian judiciary, the issue of post-SC jobs.
32Live Law, 27 Nov 2015, CJI Dattu may be o↵ered the post of NHRC Chairperson; Ms. Indira Jaising says
independence of judiciary undermined by post retirement benefits
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that “Pre-retirement judges are influenced by a desire for a post-retirement jobs.”33 Even
R. M. Lodha, a former CJI, on the day of his retirement from the Supreme Court, said “I
hold the view that the CJI, judges of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice of High Courts and
judges of High Courts should not accept any constitutional position or assignment with gov-
ernment.”34 and “The idea is to insulate judges from the lure of post-retirement jobs. Judges
don’t have to run after politicians for lucrative posts after retirement if they get a salary.”35
We contribute to this discourse by exploring the relationship between post-SC appoint-
ments and the number favourable decisions in salient cases. We do so by estimating
jobj = ⇡0 + ⇡1 number of salient cases in favour of UOI as authorj
+ ⇡2 number of salient cases in favour of UOIj + Z
0
j⇣ + "j . (5)
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the judge received a post-SC appoint-
ment from the government.36 The two independent variables of interest in this specification
are the number of salient cases that the judge decided in favour of the government and the
subset of these where he was the author. If pandering has no e↵ect on the post-SC appoint-
ments we would expect ⇡1 = ⇡2 = 0. On the other hand ⇡1 > 0 and/or ⇡2 > 0 would
be consistent with the presence of rewards for pandering. In particular, if as we argued in
section section 6, we find that ⇡1 > 0, this would suggest that over and above deciding in
favour of the government, it is writing favourable judgements that is rewarded with a post-SC
appointment.
The results are reported in table 10. The estimates for ⇡1 are positive and significant
while the estimates for ⇡2 are negative. This is consistent with governments rewarding judges
who author judgements in favour of the government in politically salient cases. In column
(2) we control for the length of the judge’s SC tenure, whether he was ever CJI, and the a
set of dummies for indicating the judge’s religion. The coe cient estimates remain stable.
To investigate further, we categorise post-SC jobs into high-profile and low-profile. We
define high-profile jobs to be appointments to permanent commissions and tribunals (PCT):
positions that survive both a) the current appointee and b) the government in power. We
provide a complete categorisation of jobs into these two groups in table 12. Their charac-
teristics mean that the high-profile jobs according to our definition attract a much greater
level of interest than the low-profile ones. The fact that the estimates of ⇡1 remain significant
for all jobs and high-profile jobs but not for low-profile ones (not reported), indicates that
pandering is rewarded with the more prestigious high-profile jobs.
33NDTV, 1 Oct 2012, Judges’ verdicts are influenced by post-retirement jobs: Arun Jaitley
34Live Law, 27 Sep 2014, There should be a cooling o↵ period of 2 years for judges to accept any appointment
after retirement; Justice Lodha
35Indian Express, 25 Oct 2015, As CJI, I told PMs of way to insulate judges from lure of post-retirement jobs:
Lodha
36The potential measurement error in our dependent variable, caused by the possibility that some of the judges
who haven’t received a job in our sample period ending in May 2014 may receive them later, is not a major concern
since we have tracked post-SC appointments of the judges in our sample till January 2017.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any job Any job PCT job PCT job Any job Any job PCT job PCT job
Number of salient cases in 0.111⇤ 0.120⇤⇤ 0.0839 0.0956⇤
favour of UOI (author) (0.0561) (0.0556) (0.0544) (0.0550)
Number of salient cases in -0.0539 -0.0539 -0.0236 -0.0297
favour of UOI (0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0360) (0.0394)
Number of salient or large 0.0726⇤⇤ 0.0672⇤⇤ 0.0688⇤⇤ 0.0629⇤⇤
bench cases in favour of UOI (author) (0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0285) (0.0293)
Number of salient or large -0.0344⇤⇤ -0.0315⇤ -0.0241 -0.0211
bench cases in favour of UOI (0.0162) (0.0184) (0.0156) (0.0180)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.053 0.147 0.046 0.106 0.078 0.149 0.083 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 10: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the judge received a post-SC job.
All specifications include the following controls: tenure in the Supreme Court, whether they were ever CJI, and religion dummies for Muslim,
Christian and Parsi (with hindu as the omitted category).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any job Any job PCT job PCT job Any job Any job PCT job PCT job
Number of salient cases in 0.0757 0.0875⇤ 0.0520 0.0645
favour of UOI (author) (0.0474) (0.0463) (0.0450) (0.0451)
Number of salient cases in -0.0330 -0.0355 -0.0131 -0.0184
favour of UOI (0.0315) (0.0329) (0.0298) (0.0322)
Number of salient or large 0.0721⇤⇤⇤ 0.0638⇤⇤ 0.0601⇤⇤ 0.0534⇤⇤
bench cases in favour of UOI (author) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0238) (0.0241)
Number of salient or large -0.0332⇤⇤ -0.0264⇤ -0.0223⇤ -0.0166
bench cases in favour of UOI (0.0144) (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.0147)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 68 68 73 73 68 68 73 73
R2 0.040 0.170 0.029 0.112 0.107 0.200 0.090 0.151
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 11: Dependent variable is the speed of post-SC job (defined in eq. (6)).
All specifications include the following controls: tenure in the Supreme Court, whether they were ever CJI, and religion dummies for Muslim,
Christian and Parsi (with hindu as the omitted category).
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So far we have only used the number of politically salient cases decided in two-judge
benches. In columns (5) – (8), we broaden our definition of salience to also include all cases
large bench cases decided in favour of the government, that is cases decided by three or more
judges. These cases tend to be important and we would expect governments to be favourably
disposed towards judges that decide these cases in their favour. We observe that the estimates
for ⇡1 continue to be positive and significant suggesting once again that judgement authorship
in salient cases that are decided in favour of the government tend to be rewarded. Interestingly
the estimates for ⇡2 are negative and significant suggesting that merely deciding in favour of
the government although necessary, is not su cient to increase the prospects of post-SC jobs.
Indeed, the estimates suggest that for a judge it is the proportion of salient winning cases for
the government where he is the judgement author that matter for a post-SC appointment.
Finally, we explore whether pandering is associated with the speed with which judges are
appointed to post-SC jobs. To do so we construct
Speedj =
8>>><>>>:
0 if no post-SC job
1
1+timej
if timej   0
1 if timej < 0
(6)
where timej are the years from retirement to appointment to a post-SC job. Since speed is a
more continuous form of the indicator variable for whether a judge obtained a post-SC job,
it may be a more fine-grained measure of the government’s desire to reward a judge. Results
are reported in table table 11. The same pattern discussed earlier emerges, with authorship
of favourable decisions in salient cases being positively associated with the speed with which
a judge is appointed to a post-SC job.
These results run contrary to the expectation that corruption at such a high-level, under
such intense public scrutiny, is subtle and surreptitious. Moreover, it striking that this type
of arrangement can be detected statistically using a sample of only 74 observations. However,
although suggestive, note that on its own this need not be causal evidence of corruption. Even
though we control for observable judge characteristics, this correlation could be explained
by the unobservable “type” of judges, e.g., political ideology or pro-/anti-government bias,
driving both their rulings and their likelihood of obtaining a post-SC job. Nonetheless, since
we have established that judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favour of the
government, the correlations presented in this section would seem, at least in part, to be
driven by rewards for actual pandering.
8 Conclusion
We find that, first, judges respond to pandering incentives by ruling in favour of the govern-
ment and, second, the government rewards judges who have authored favourable judgements
with prestigious jobs. Furthermore, we characterise two channels through which pandering
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occurs. First, pandering occurs through actively writing favourable judgements rather than
passively being on a bench that decides the case. Second, pandering works through potentially
harmful manipulation of actual decisions in favour of the government rather than through
more benign means, such as manipulating judgement authorship. Our results are not driven
by “rotten apples”, i.e., type di↵erences in the integrity of judges, but rather by a rational
behavioural response to perverse institutional incentives in the form of career concerns.
The findings we report are important because this kind of corruption potentially consti-
tutes a very serious miscarriage of justice, with far-reaching welfare implications. However,
we note that the welfare implications depend on whether the “correct” rulings, i.e. the
ones judges would make in the absence of pandering incentives, are welfare-maximising. For
instance, pandering could lead to a welfare gain if the Supreme Court is otherwise biased
against the government, and pandering incentives help steer the Court towards “better” de-
cisions. This is related to the idea, found in Huntington (1968) and Bardhan (1997), that the
presence of corruption can improve outcomes in a second-best world with many distortions
already present. Evaluating whether pandering reduces or increases welfare faces two prob-
lems. First, identifying anything about the “correctness” of a ruling requires deep textual
analysis, which is infeasible on a large scale. Second, there is no natural way of identifying
the welfare-maximising ruling when it requires taking sides between, for example, a pro-free
speech Court and a pro-security government.
Nevertheless, regardless of the welfare implications, the presence of pandering in the
Supreme Court undermines notions of judicial integrity and independence. The importance
of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is captured by the maxim “justice must not
only be done but must be seen to be done”. Frequent allegations of pandering suggest that
clearly justice is not seen to be done. Moreover, our results documenting the presence of such
pandering suggest that justice is in fact not always done.
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A Data appendix
Figure 2: Judge tenures.
Each bar represents the tenure of a judge. Solid bars are for judges who retire at least one year before an
election, while hatched bars are for judges who retire less than one year before an election. The sa↵ron
line represent elections won by the NDA while the light blue lines represent elections won by the UPA.
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Position Institution Frequency
Permanent commissions and tribunals
Chairperson Appellate Tribunal for Electricity 1
Chairperson Armed Forces Tribunal 1
Chairperson Competition Appellate Tribunal 3
Governor Government of Kerala 1
President National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 2
Chairperson National Forest Commission 1
Chairperson National Green Tribunal 2
Chairperson/Member National Human Rights Commission 5
Chairperson Press Council of India 2
Chairperson Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal 4
Judge International Court of Justice 1
Other jobs
Chairperson Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal 1
Chairperson Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal 1
Chairperson Mahadayi Water Disputes Tribunal 1
Chairperson Vamsadhara Water Disputes Tribunal 1
Chairperson Law Commission of India 4
Chairperson Pay Commission 1
Chairperson M. B. Shah Commision of Inquiry on Illegal Mining 1
Chairperson Nanavati Commission 1
Chairperson S. Saghir Ahmed Commission 1
Chairperson U.C Banerjee Commission on the Godhra riots 1
Chairperson Central University of Jharkhand 1
Professor National University of Juridical Sciences 2
Chancellor Sikkim University 1
Table 12: Post-SC jobs and frequencies
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